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Social deviance is a concept used in the social sciences to represent all social actions – or in 
some cases words and images – that transgress socially accepted behavioural norms and 
ethical standards. Social deviance is a far broader term than crime. The latter is restricted to 
actions or signs that exist beyond boundaries set by law, whilst the former incorporates crime 
but also includes any legal action, word or image deemed unacceptable. The disciplines of 
sociology and criminology share a long history of dealing with the concept of social 
deviance, a history that, roughly speaking, moved through the layered phases of classicism, 
positivism/integrationism, pluralism and radicalism. 
 
Before these disciplines became established, the concept was the preserve of theologians, 
philosophers and legal theorists. The classical phase came into being when Protestant and 
Enlightenment thinking distinguished crime from the broader religious concept of sin. As it 
developed from these historical watersheds, classical liberal thought, with its growing faith in 
the rationalized legal system as the product of the new ‘like minds’ of universal reason, 
tended to conflate deviance with the legal category of crime. The social context in which 
deviance takes place was largely absent from these early debates and policies on law and 
punishment. Deviance was seen as the product of the individual’s failure to exercise innate 
powers of will, reason and morality. For Kant’s (1998) intrinsicalist philosophy the deviant 
individual had failed to to abide by the injunction of the categorical imperative. This refusal 
to become acquainted with and conform to the demands of universal reason as 
institutionalised in law was a wilful and punishable rejection of God’s gift of reason. For the 
British utilitarians and their consequentialist philosophy, the act of deviance was a product of 
the innately hedonistic individual’s failure to act according to rational calculations of the 
harmful consequences of intended actions. Punishment was necessary as a deterrent to the 
self and third-party observers alike. Although the volume of punishment in Europe and the 
USA proliferated during the nineteenth century, the physical brutality that characterized the 
worst pre-modern punishments was gradually replaced by more humane techniques. 
Punishment and the classification and understanding of deviance were brought under the 
control of rationalised systems of knowledge and law (see ‘social control’). 
 
However, despite the emergence of rationalized institutions of science and law, in late 
eighteenth and nineteenth century Europe all individuals lived during a time of great 
socioeconomic disruption. In Britain, the first fully-blown industrial capitalist nation, the 
countryside was emptying and the new industrial urban areas were rapidly expanding. Since 
Rousseau, deviance and crime had been associated with the pathologies of an urban life that 
for him was inevitably decadent, corrupt and unnatural. In some urban locales the disruption 
of traditional sociocultural institutions such as the family and the community was at its height 
and poverty was endemic. Between 1780 and 1830 London experienced a 540 per cent rise in 
recorded crime. Other major cities in Europe were also beginning to experience rapid 
expansion and increasing crime rates. The first sociologists of crime and deviance were 
positivists, such as Adolphe Quetelet (1984), an astronomer and mathematician interested in 
using his expertise to analyse the social world. At the time a new orthodox way of thinking 
about deviance developed, and it became the norm to regard it as a social pathology, a 
metaphor derived from comparisons made between the social and physical bodies.  This 
important development drove social science away from classical liberal individualism to the 
search for social, temporal and spatial patterns of crime. Where patterns could be discerned it 
became acceptable to hypothesize social causes, such as inadequate parenting and 
socialisation, anomie, social disorganisation, egoism, demoralisation, lack of social bonding 
and so on. These hypotheses and their endless testing and elaboration formed the backbone of 
positivist research programmes in the social sciences, and indeed still survive today in many 
of the West’s government departments and prestigious policy-oriented research universities.  
Deviant actions were judged by the categories of law and harm, and they were the products of 
deeper tensions and strains that disrupt the harmonious workings of society and culture. At 
the same time, however, some thinkers, such as Herbert Spencer (1851), made connections 
between social determinism and biological determinism, fueling the subsequent eugenics 
movement, which supplied scientific justification to the ‘breeding out’ of sections of the 
population whose deviance was attributed to their genetic inferiority. It could certainly be 
argued that determinism’s progressive dimension was often overshadowed by its dark side. 
 
Most of the sociology of deviance’s development took place in the USA and Europe. Perhaps 
the most prominent positivist school was Emile Durkheim’s functionalism. He 
conceptualized society as an organism, with each institution functioning to reproduce the 
social order. Following his work on the sacred and the profane in The Elementary Forms of 
Religious Life (2001), he argued that the reproduction of societies depends on the 
maintenance of a consensual morality. He was one of the first sociologists to follow the 
anthropological model and place the public ritual of naming and punishing deviance at the 
heart of social cohesion and reproduction. A low level of deviance is normal, he argued, as is 
the ritualized punishment of deviance that functions to signify what lies beyond the limits of 
the moral norm in a spectacular way that impresses itself on the minds of the population. 
Thus a ‘normal’ level of deviance maintains society’s boundaries, but a surfeit indicates that 
the pathologies of excessive individualism, egoism and anomie are being thrown up in times 
of rapid economic disruption. Durkheim’s theory was taken up by Robert Merton. In his 
‘strain theory’ Merton (1938) argued that the inability of individuals to fulfil ambitions and 
desires incited by the American Dream would create social strain and a subsequent sense of 
anomie, or ‘normlessness’. In a society where the structure of opportunities is unequal, 
frustration and the abandonment of norms, and a subsequent increase in crime and deviance, 
are more likely.  
 
In the USA the early Chicago School of Sociology followed the positivist and Durkheimian 
lines, arguing that in chaotic zones of transition in rapidly industrialising American cities 
with a large influx of immigrants, traditional cultural systems tend to break down. The 
pathological and anomic result of this disruption is social disorganization, indicated by a 
multitude of observable indicators of various deviant acts such as prostitution, theft, violence 
and so on. However, the later Chicago School shifted its position and began to use symbolic 
interactionist theories, drawn from Wilhelm Dilthey’s (2002) notion of Verstehen and the 
pragmatist social psychology of Cooley (1902), Mead (1934) and others. This marked a shift 
from social pathologization to cultural appreciation. Deviance was not the observable 
indicator of an underlying pathology created by social disruption but a culturally creative and 
innovative way of coping with extremely difficult circumstances. Deviance was the product 
of the human ability to constantly renegotiate meaning in the construction of identity and 
moral norms.  
 
In his theory of differential association, the Chicago School sociologist Edwin Sutherland 
(1937) further challenged the Durkheimian theory of social disorganisation by arguing that all 
societies were differentially organised, a view that began to shift the balance from 
integrationism to pluralism. The tendency to deviate from the mainstream norm and indulge 
in crime was a matter of the complex machinations of meaning-generation, power and 
influence within different cultural and sub-cultural groups; thus deviance was not a universal 
category, and neither was it a defining feature or permanent fixture of any social group. 
 In the nineteen-fifties attempts were made to synthesise strain and sub-cultural theories of 
deviance, based on the idea of deviant sub-cultures as ‘splinters’ created as alienated young 
people rejected the mainstream norms of an unequal society that excluded them.  This 
attempt to marry integrationism with pluralism was only partially successful, and in the 
nineteen-sixties the sociology of deviance took a strong pluralist and social constructionist 
turn, in which the main cause of crime was identified as social reaction. Symbolic 
interactionist theorists argued that we are all deviant, and initial minor acts of social deviance 
provoke the reactions of disapproval, ostracism and criminalisation. ‘Deviant’ was a label 
stuck on individuals from plural backgrounds by a reactionary power elite. As already-
alienated individuals identified with the label, minor deviance was amplified and intensified 
in a spiral of social rejection and increasing crime.  
 
British variants of symbolic interactionism combined with conflict theory and structural 
Marxism to produce the New Criminology (Taylor et al. 1973), which was more sensitive to 
the unequal structure of power in capitalist societies and the corresponding structural 
imbalance in the ability to define, criminalise and punish deviance. The structural power 
imbalance across the axes of gender and race was also added to the mix throughout the 
nineteen-seventies and nineteen-eighties as the sociology of deviance took a distinctly radical 
turn. The claim that the governmental, corporate and white-collar crimes of rich, powerful 
and white males were overlooked whilst poor black men were disproportionately arrested and 
punished is now a long standing motif in critical criminology. Feminists argued that female 
offenders, again largely from the ranks of the poor, were regarded as ‘doubly deviant’ as their 
initial criminalisation was compounded by the social stigma attached to their refusal to 
conform to the submissive and domesticated social roles forced upon them in a patriarchal 
society. 
 
Critical sociology did not have everything its own way. As arguments became more complex 
in the volatile and disruptive period of political and economic history of the 1980s, 
sociological and criminological schools proliferated. Labelling theory became less 
fashionable as crime rates rose in the post-war age of affluence and permissiveness, an 
unforeseen development that sent sociology and criminology into what Jock Young (1987) 
called an ‘aetiological crisis’, a loss of faith in its ability to identify and explain the causes of 
crime with existing theories. Classical and positivist schools remained dominant in 
government circles whilst radical criminology developed through post-structuralist and 
postmodernist schools to the complex diversity that exists today.  
 
It’s difficult to pin down such a proliferation of theories, but if one discernable fault line can 
be said to run through the whole history of the sociology of deviance it’s that which 
demarcates integrationism and pluralism, with structural conflict theories straddling the two.  
The integrationist definition of deviance, based on the assumption that a society is an 
integrated whole, is the appearance in everyday social life of actions or signs from beyond the 
boundaries of society that can disrupt our sense of normality, stability and predictability. The 
pluralist definition, by contrast, is any action or sign that transgresses the behavioural norms 
or ethical standards of any one of a huge diversity of legitimate cultural groups that constitute 
the broader society. Structural conflict theories argue that these plural groups are the product 
of – or at least defined by – their location in a fundamentally unequal social structure. The 
integration of plural groups is not organic but possible only by pursuing political demands for 
democracy, tolerance and equality.  
 If we follow the pluralist line, the main problem is that although societies contain many 
different cultures there is usually only one governmental and legal system, which must cater 
for all. In other words, there are inevitable clashes between plural cultures and integrationist 
law, especially where the governmental and legal system disproportionately represents the 
interests of the powerful structural elite. For instance, drawing satirical cartoons of deities or 
prophets is not illegal, a ruling that all citizens must accept, but the meaning of disrespect and 
profanity behind this communicative act can be considered deviant by those with a strong 
sense of the holiness of their religious figures, especially if they also see themselves as a 
submerged and oppressed socioeconomic class. On the other hand, secularist liberal and 
libertarian groups are likely to argue that the principal of freedom of expression is paramount.  
 
The legal system is in the unenviable position of arbitrating between these two conflicting 
interest-groups. In a purportedly democratic pluralist order, transposing an act felt to be 
deviant by one group into an integrationist law that everyone must obey – in this case a law 
redefining blasphemy as potential ‘hate speech’ – is not easy. A society’s lawmakers face 
extreme difficulty in reconciling cultural clashes and satisfying everyone. Ideally, in liberal 
democracies, the unstable and sometimes rather fractious relationship between cultural 
notions of deviance and legal definitions of crime should be under constant scrutiny, debate 
and change, with relatively powerless groups fully included in the democratic process. 
However, to what extent liberal democratic governments recognise socioeconomic inequality 
and the relatively elite status of some groups that make up the plurality is of great interest to 
social scientists and philosophers alike. Fundamental to this interest is the issue of whether 
some cultural and political groups have more power than others to define and criminalise 
deviance, and, if so, how dominant positions are structured into a particular society and 
reproduced over time. 
 
To most of today’s social scientists, who regard integrationism as rather outdated and assume 
either a genuine pluralist democracy or a set of unequal structured power relations to be the 
bedrock of society, social deviance is regarded as a ‘contested category’. In other words, it is 
constantly thrown into question because there is rarely full agreement on its validity across 
the variety of individuals and cultural groups that make up a society. In fact we might see it 
as the most contested category of all, because how it is defined has serious consequences for 
individuals in terms of how much liberty they enjoy, how much authority they must obey and 
how they might defend themselves as potential victims of actions or signs that offend them. If 
a society allows too much harmful deviance to build up in everyday life, the stability of the 
social order and the quality of life the majority enjoy on an everyday basis might be 
threatened. However, if the same society’s set of authoritative institutions represses citizens 
and threatens civil liberties as it attempts to reduce what it has the power to define as harmful 
deviance, then the quality of life could also be threatened in the name of preserving the social 
order as it stands. As the conservative philosopher Michael Oakeshott (1996) has argued, all 
societies are permanently caught on the horns of a political dilemma, forced to compromise 
between the equally deleterious consequences of the ‘barbarism of disorder’ and the 
‘barbarism of order’. How various individuals or social groups define deviance will depend 
quite significantly on the relative weight they give to either of these sets of consequences.  
 
Oakeshott perhaps glosses over the problem of structurally imbalanced power that concerns 
sociologists. It is usually the case that the institutions of authority that preserve order have 
more influence over cultural definitions of deviance because they tend to act on behalf of the 
corporate elite and their rather supine mass media, which have an ideological advantage over 
less wealthy and powerful civil institutions such as education and religion. They also have the 
exclusive legislative rights to define concepts of deviance as ‘crime’ and punish offenders. 
Everyday people have relatively less cultural and legal power, and empowering them very 
much depends on the degree of true democracy that prevails in society, and whether or not 
the society is truly plural or unduly influenced by a hegemonic ideology that operates on 
behalf of the powerful. 
 
If we drill down further beneath social theories and politics to the philosophical roots of the 
problem, we can see that the category of social deviance is rendered problematic by the 
perennial tension between universalism and relativism. The universalist argument claims that 
a consensus can be reached on the ethical and normative quality of most deviant actions.  In 
contrast, from a relativist standpoint, the ethical and epistemological constitution of all 
societies is naturally and unalterably plural right down to the bedrock, and therefore all 
categories are contested and no such consensus can ever be established. Complicating matters 
further is the problem of situational relativism, where an act such as murder, even if it is 
consensually agreed to be criminal under normal circumstances, might be excused or even 
viewed as beneficial and necessary under other circumstances, such as war or a criminal 
attack where both person and property need to be defended.  
 
Giorgio Agamben (2005) has argued, however, that in all hierarchical societies there is an 
unassailable socio-political power imbalance because the dominant group can declare a ‘state 
of exception’ and redefine marginal members of society as homo sacer, the ‘sacred man’ who 
can – both metaphorically and in reality – be murdered at will without incurring disapproval 
or punishment. This apparently rather contradictory notion has its roots in the western 
anthropological tradition of sacrifice, under which the pharmakos, for instance, a group of 
lower-class scapegoats in Ancient Greece, were seen as dispensable but also sacred insofar as 
their ritualised sacrifice could save society from the wrath of the Gods, a metaphor for the 
forces that lead to the breakdown of the social order. When societies are seen to be threatened 
and in need of salvation, deviance, crime and heroism can be all rolled into one. It’s certainly 
possible to argue that because it lacks consensus and a broad sense of stability, a pluralist 
society is more susceptible to the suggestion that it is close to breakdown. Sociologists are 
aware that the ‘politics of fear’ can be used by a dominant group to impart the suggestion of 
social breakdown in the minds of the population, thus legitimising its use of violence and 
intimidation to divert the society from the path to disorder. Yet, such violence and 
intimidation in the hands of everyday people is classified as deviant and criminal, or in 
extreme cases terroristic. 
 
However, ‘affirmative postmodernists’, according to Henry and Milovanovic (1996), take a 
less rigid position by arguing that there are degrees of relativism according to the seriousness 
of the deviant acts. For instance, peripheral crimes such as drug use could be decriminalised 
without causing any more harm. Harm could even be reduced by in turn reducing the 
likelihood of instrumental violence committed by members of the criminal gangs which 
distribute illegal drugs, and allowing more drug users who become addicted to disclose their 
drug use and receive appropriate medical help rather than turn to crime and violence to 
acquire their personal supplies. In this way some actions that were formerly deviant could 
become normalised. On the other hand, serious ‘core crimes’ such as murder or rape would 
be retained with appropriate punishments or rehabilitation strategies for the offenders. This 
weak version of relativism is problematic insofar as it introduces a consensual viewpoint at 
the centre of the relativist milieu, from which serious ‘core crimes’ can be distinguished from 
minor peripheral acts of deviance. Therefore it could be argued that affirmative 
postmodernism is really neither relativist nor pluralist because it places a universalist, 
integrationist hub at the centre of society’s moral order. 
 
The strong version of universalism claims that all individuals, cultural groups and societies 
can and should agree to regard specific acts as deviant, and that all legal systems should 
regard the most serious harmful acts as criminal. Weaker variants allow for some differences 
and disputes over the more minor peripheral actions that do not seriously threaten the 
principles of universal reason and morality. Murder, for instance, should be universally 
regarded as deviant and strictly forbidden by law in the vast majority of circumstances. 
Universalists, however, do not discount exceptional circumstances such as self-defence or 
loss of sanity. In that case it would appear that Agamben’s ‘state of exception’ can also be 
declared in a universalist, integrationist society; in fact one could argue that it is easier for 
such a society to do so because its governmental apparatus and cultural codes carry more 
authority and legitimacy amongst the whole population. Agamben’s concept is powerful 
because we can see it operating ideologically and politically in both pluralist and 
integrationist societies. In the former the unease caused by less stability and consensus makes 
it is easier for a dominant group to come into being by claiming to have the means of 
avoiding potential breakdown. In the latter the dominant group already has the integrated 
political and ideological authority to make the suggestion more believable throughout the 
population.  
 
The weak version of relativism simply claims that we should recognise variety and difference 
in all societies and cultures, but allow for some universal categories; this version is common 
amongst orthodox liberal sociologists in the West. The strong version of sociological 
relativism is based on the philosophy of moral relativism, which claims that what is regarded 
as right and wrong is the business of nobody but the members of the huge variety of local 
cultures situated at various points in historical time and geographical space. As sociology 
goes global and comparative studies between a wider variety of cultures become the norm, it 
could be argued that the stronger version of relativism might need to be given more 
consideration. Where older structural sociologists looked at universal social structures such as 
class, gender and race as the bedrock of all societies, constantly emphasising the hierarchies 
and power imbalances across these axes, post-structural sociology took what has become 
known as the ‘cultural turn’ in the later twentieth century. Ethnomethodologists claim that 
meaning is purely a local achievement, and some postmodernists, including Foucauldians, 
would argue that the social world has always been composed of many different discourses, or 
methods of classifying the world and producing truth and knowledge, and it is inappropriate 
to privilege one ‘regime of truth’ over another. Therefore the human subjects of discourses 
that are locally and culturally specific – or which structure specific taste-communities that 
converge around issues such as sexual preference or drug use – have the right to live 
alongside their discursive definitions (often called ‘discursive objects’) of deviance along 
with their corresponding legal categories and punishments.  
 
However, it could be argued that extreme relativism is simply the road to existentialism and 
situationalism; it has nowhere else to go. In the absence of a universal authority – proclaimed 
by Nietzsche (1974) as the ‘death of God’ and recently by postmodernists as the ‘death of the 
subject’ and the ‘death of the social’ – we could insist that the buck must stop somewhere, 
and the individual is all that is left standing. Thus existentialism enjoins each individual to be 
responsible for his or her own morality and behaviour in each situation as it is encountered. 
In this way of thinking there are as many unique and fleeting forms of normality and 
deviance as there are individuals and situations. Even here, at the door of the individual so 
hallowed in liberal culture, we still find possible problems as the existential individual runs 
the risk of stumbling into the extreme condition of solipsism, which permits the individual 
subject to see itself as the almost deified centre of the universe, in command of all moral 
categories and actions. The formerly social category of deviance is now subject to the whim 
of each individual, with potentially chaotic consequences. Partly in response to some of the 
excesses of postmodernist sociology, contemporary forms of culturalism, proposed by 
philosophers and sociologists from the European social democratic mainstream, such as 
Jurgen Habermas (2001), have promoted the idea of ‘cosmopolitanism’, which claims that 
disparate cultures are now integrating as they share social spaces in the new multicultural 
urban milieus. Consensus and progress, and therefore the possibility of working towards 
universal notions of deviance and crime, are now back on the sociological agenda. 
 
In both universalist and relativist schools of thought problems immediately arise over the 
definition of harm and its victims. Beck’s solution to the problem of harm was the concept of 
risk, with which the potential deleterious effects of human desires and actions can be foreseen 
and possibly avoided or minimised. This has been taken on board quite seriously by 
contemporary criminologists and sociologists of deviance. For instance, individuals should be 
aware that their desire to pursue leisure activities at night might result in encounters with the 
well-known relationship between alcohol and violence. Similarly, the desire to drive an 
attractive open-top car might increase the risk of theft. This has led to theories of risk 
management, which could be seen as a rather defeatist position that accepts crime and 
deviance as inevitable risks to be managed rather than problems to be solved. 
 
However, the concept of risk is underpinned by the accompanying concept of harm, which is 
far more grounded than deviance, but still a broad and rather nebulous term that could cover 
any consequence from a minor individual inconvenience to a massive environmental 
catastrophe with the potential to jeopardise the lives of millions. Liberal cultures tend to 
regard the individual as the principal victim, and argue that harm should be first and foremost 
defined as that which inflicts some sort of physical, psychological or social injury on the 
individual. Collectivist cultures can often see the preservation of the social order as more 
important, and label as harmful the actions of any individual or group that threaten its 
authority and stability. Authoritarian regimes can often transpose the concept of harm from 
the act to the individual. This practice suggests that harm is not an act committed by an 
individual who has temporarily erred, but an expression of a predictable trait that 
characterises an individual who has a durable deviant/harmful personality, which should be 
criminalised and subjected to punishment or indeterminate treatment regimes. We have 
arrived full circle back to the core philosophical tension between liberty and authority, which 
underpins the argument between pluralism and integrationism. Pluralist sociological theories 
tend to define deviance and harm in ways that suits their cause celebre of emancipation and 
diversity, and to propose narrower definitions alongside the merits of decriminalizing 
peripheral acts. Integrationist sociological positions that prioritise stability and social 
cohesion over personal liberty tend to propose broader definitions of deviance and harm, and 
far more caution over the issue of decriminalisation. 
 
Despite the popularity of concepts such as risk there are no easy solutions to these enduring 
problems, and the fundamental ethical problem of prioritising personal liberty or social 
stability remains. Now that sociology is global, it is even more difficult to construct an 
Archimedean point that transcends the preferences shown by different cultures to different 
sociological schools and theories. According to Downes and Rock, in their seminal student 
text Understanding Deviance (2007), we confront the Tower of Babel whenever we approach 
the term, a dizzying array of contradictory and competing visions of individuals and the 
social order, with correspondingly varied definitions of deviance. If this sort of pluralism is 
indeed the bedrock of society, with no ‘eternal truths and verities’ underneath it, there is little 
we can do other than take the advice of Habermas and maintain an ongoing debate with 
honest and open forms of communication in the effort to achieve some consensus wherever it 
can be found, and to encourage tolerance where it cannot. Transposing into social science a 
phrase coined by the philosopher John Locke, the criminologists Ian Loader and Richard 
Sparks (2010) have recently argued that the true role social scientists is one of under-labourer 
to these plural debates, supplying research data and concepts to maintain what, because of the 
emotive nature of the terms deviance and crime, is an unavoidably public debate at the 
required level of sophistication. In liberal societies tolerance has become a shibboleth, but 
difficulties arise over where the line between tolerance and intolerance should be drawn, 
which pushes us straight back into the debate between universalism and relativism.  
 
Because it cannot really be defined clearly in the first place and remains hotly contested, 
deviance is probably the most difficult of all concepts for sociologists or criminologists to 
operationalize and test in their research, and to integrate into theories of the social world. For 
instance, for some feminists, prostitution is the product of structural oppression and 
exploitation and, whilst sex workers should be treated with tolerance and sympathy, the 
largely male clients should be regarded as the oppressors and exploiters and duly 
criminalised. However, for other feminists and non-feminists alike, who adopt a more 
libertarian position, prostitution is so old and common across the world’s cultures, and our 
current societies are so dominated by market transactions in which everything is treated as a 
commodity, that neither the sex-worker nor the client should be described as deviant or 
criminal. Here we confront yet another philosophical problem in the tension between 
idealism and pragmatism, either of which can be regarded as a valid viewpoint from which 
we judge human actions and their consequences. 
 
Are there ways for sociologists to prise themselves out of these multiple impasses? It could 
be argued that some long-standing core deviant behaviours (or ‘taboos’) such as incest and 
murder, are, where there are no mitigating circumstances, still universally regarded as 
unacceptable. However, even incest was actively affirmed and encouraged amongst some 
social elites, such as the Ancient Egyptian Royalty. As we have seen, what some describe as 
the core crime of killing has been allowed during wartime, in self-defence and in defence of 
honour and property. Almost any act of deviance or crime can be justified in special 
circumstances, and we have seen in Agamben’s concept of the ‘state of exception’, an 
authoritarian state and its ruling elite can grant itself the power to define special 
circumstances and act within them according to its own collective will. However, Slavoj 
Žižek (2008) has recently reminded us that such runaway collective power acting beyond 
normal boundaries also provides a space in which the powerful individual can grant him or 
herself the permission to commit acts of deviance or crime in the name of the collective good. 
Individual freedom and authoritarian collectivism are not mutually exclusive, and there are 
circumstances in which they are not even in opposition. Thus the standard liberal notion that 
too much collective power can crush the rights and freedoms of individuals is rather 
simplistic; in the state of exception the rights and liberties of elite individuals are actually 
extended, and social norms can be violated at will. In Theorizing Crime and Deviance (2012), 
it is argued that these elite individuals, having achieved a position of ‘special liberty’, might 
support authoritarian collectivism as the only form of social order in which their freedom to 
deviate remains unchallenged. In his notion of ‘criminal sovereignty’, Robert Cribb (2009) 
argues that authoritarianism can legitimise itself with more ease in chaotic situations that 
provoke fear and a sense of danger amongst the population. Here, in a territory where the 
state has failed – perhaps because of a natural disaster or neoliberal economic restructuring 
programmes imposed on territories on behalf of corporations that prefer weak and compliant 
states to reduce taxes and labour costs – a deviant elite characterised by criminality and 
corruption is more likely to appear. 
 
In order to transcend these multiple sociological and philosophical problems, contemporary 
analyses try to explain the forms of ‘deviance’ we see today as incorporated deviance, created 
and reproduced because, when controlled and harnessed, it has a ‘function’ in the consumer-
capitalist economy. In The Exclusive Society (1999), for instance, Jock Young argues that 
contemporary capitalism is bulimic, incorporating young people into consumer culture’s 
structure of desires whilst at the same time ejecting them from the economy, thus increasing 
the likelihood of deviance and crime. This is a cautious and partial revival of strain theory, 
which views the ‘malady of infinite aspirations’ as culturally constructed rather than natural. 
Alternatively, In Criminal Identities and Consumer Culture (2008), the research team 
conceptualise today’s forms of deviance as the ‘spillage’ that occurs as the contemporary 
capitalist system invokes and intensifies solipsistic, narcissistic and anti-social human drives, 
which in a more ethical society would be classified as deviant. The system is conceptualised 
as a ‘pseudo-pacification process’, which subsequently attempts to contain and harness these 
drives as dynamic forces that fuel the continuous expansion of human desires for symbolic 
objects, which create an imaginary social world in the place of the real one that has 
disappeared. These desires are translated into demand in the vital consumer dimension of the 
economy. The dynamic tension operates at such a pitch that spillage is inevitable throughout 
the social order. Controlled deviance overheats and breaks through the control system at its 
weakest points to appear as plural forms of uncontrolled deviance. Even these new theories 
are open to criticisms such as universalism and essentialism, and it remains to be seen how 
successful new theories might be as they develop in their efforts to solve the multiple 
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